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We construct a utility-based model of fluctuations, with nominal rigidities and unemployment, and
draw its implications for the unemployment-inflation tradeoff and for the conduct of monetary policy.
We proceed in two steps. We first leave nominal rigidities aside. We show that, under a standard utility
specification, productivity shocks have no effect on unemployment in the constrained efficient allocation.
We then focus on the implications of alternative real wage setting mechanisms for fluctuations in unemployment.
We show the role of labor market frictions and real wage rigidities in determining the effects of productivity
shocks on unemployment.
We then introduce nominal rigidities in the form of staggered price setting by firms. We derive the
relation between inflation and unemployment and discuss how it is influenced by the presence of labor
market frictions and real wage rigidities. We show the nature of the tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment stabilization, and its dependence on labor market characteristics. We draw the implications









Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI)
Ramon Trias Fargas 25
08005 Barcelona  SPAIN
and NBER
jordi.gali@upf.edu1 Introduction
The New-Keynesian model (the NK model, for short) has emerged as a powerful
tool for monetary policy analysis in the presence of nominal rigidities. Its adop-
tion as the backbone of the medium-scale models currently developed by many
central banks and policy institutions is a clear re°ection of its success. This pop-
ularity may be viewed as somewhat surprising given that standard versions of
the NK paradigm do not generate movements in unemployment, only voluntary
movements in hours of work or employment.1
This provides the motivation for our paper. We extend the NK model by in-
troducing a more realistic labor market, with frictions similar to those found in
the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model of unemployment
(the DMP model, henceforth). This extension allows us to characterize the e®ects
of productivity shocks on both unemployment and in°ation, and to show how
these e®ects depend both on monetary policy and on the nature of labor market
frictions. It also allows us to derive optimal monetary policy, and characterize its
dependence on labor market frictions, to answer for example how monetary policy
should di®er, depending on whether, for example, the labor market is °uid|as
in the United States|or sclerotic instead|as in Continental Europe.
The paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 sets up the basic model with frictions, leaving out nominal rigidities.
We capture labor market frictions through hiring costs increasing in labor market
tightness|de¯ned as the ratio of hires to the unemployment pool. We then char-
acterize the constrained-e±cient allocation: Frictions lead to unemployment, but
the unemployment rate is invariant to productivity shocks. The reason is that,
as in the corresponding model without frictions, income and substitution e®ects
cancel, leading to no change in employment, and in unemployment. Frictions do
not a®ect this outcome.
Section 3 characterizes the decentralized equilibrium under alternative wage-
setting mechanisms. As is well understood, frictions create a wage band, within
1. Paradoxically, this was viewed as one of the main weaknesses of the RBC model, but was
then exported to the NK model.
3which any real wage is consistent with private e±ciency. We thus explore two al-
ternatives. We ¯rst assume Nash-bargaining. In this case, the unemployment rate
is typically di®erent from the constrained-e±cient rate, but, like the constrained-
e±cient rate, it is also invariant to productivity shocks. We then allow for more
rigid real wages, and show that in this case, productivity shocks lead to ine±cient
°uctuations in unemployment. We characterize these °uctuations as a function
of the labor market frictions and the degree of real wage rigidity.
Section 4 introduces nominal rigidities, in the form of staggering of price decisions
by ¯rms. Productivity shocks now a®ect both the in°ation rate and the unemploy-
ment rate. We derive the relation between in°ation and unemployment implied
by the model, and contrast it to the standard NK formulation. Put crudely, the
model implies a relation between in°ation and labor market tightness. This in
turn implies a relation between in°ation and both the level and the change in the
unemployment rate.
Section 5 turns to the implications for monetary policy. It shows that stabilizing
unemployment in response to productivity shocks requires allowing for transito-
rily higher in°ation. It shows how stabilizing in°ation leads to large and ine±cient
movements in unemployment (recall that constrained-e±cient unemployment is
constant) . It shows how the persistence of unemployment is higher in more scle-
rotic markets, i.e. markets in which the separation and the hiring rate are lower.
It then derives optimal monetary policy, showing its dependence on labor market
characteristics
Section 6 o®ers two calibrations of the model, one aimed at capturing the United
States, the other aimed at capturing continental Europe, with its more scle-
rotic labor markets. In each case, it presents the implications of pursuing either
in°ation-stabilizing, unemployment-stabilizing, or optimal monetary policy. We
also study the extent to which a simple interest rate rule can approximate the
optimal policy outcomes.
Section 7 indicates how our model relates to the existing{and rapidly growing{
literature on the relative roles of labor market frictions, real wage rigidities, and
nominal price rigidities in shaping °uctuations. This literature started with Mon-
4ica Merz's (1995) integration of labor market frictions in an RBC model, and
now encompasses a number of medium size DSGE models with labor market
frictions, and real and nominal wage and price rigidities. We see the compara-
tive strength of our paper as being in its simplicity. This simplicity allows for an
analytical characterization of °uctuations, and an analytical derivation of opti-
mal policy. It makes clear the separate role of frictions, real wage rigidities, and
monetary policy, in mediating the e®ects of productivity shocks on in°ation and
unemployment.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 Assumptions
Preferences
The representative household is made up of a continuum of members represented












where Ct is a CES function over a continuum of goods with elasticity of substi-
tution ², and Nt denotes the fraction of household members who are employed.
The latter must satisfy the constraint
0 · Nt · 1 (2)
Note that such a speci¯cation of utility di®ers from the one generally used in the
DMP model, where the marginal rate of substitution is assumed to be constant.
Our speci¯cation is, instead, one often used in models of the business cycle, given
its consistency with a balanced growth path and the direct parametrization of
the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity by Á.
5Technology
We assume a continuum of ¯rms indexed by i 2 [0;1], each producing a di®eren-
tiated ¯nal good. All ¯rms have access to an identical technology
Yt(i) = Xt(i)
where Xt(i) is the quantity of the (single) intermediate good.
The latter is produced by a large number of identical, perfectly competitive ¯rms,
indexed by j 2 [0;1], and with a production function2
Xt(j) = At Nt(j)
Variable At represents the state of technology, which is assumed to be common
across ¯rms and to vary exogenously over time.
Employment in ¯rm j evolves according to
Nt(j) = (1 ¡ ±) Nt¡1(j) + Ht(j)
where ± 2 (0;1) is an exogenous separation rate, and Ht(j) represents the measure
of workers hired by ¯rm j in period t. Note that new hires start working in the
period they are hired.
Labor Market
Flows and Timing.
At the beginning of period t there is a pool of jobless individuals who are avail-
able for hire, and whose size we denote by Ut. We refer to the latter variable as
beginning-of-period unemployment (or just unemployment, for short). We make
assumptions below that guarantee full participation, i.e. at all times all individ-
uals are either employed or willing to work, given the prevailing labor market
2. The motivation for the separation between ¯nal goods producers with monopoly power and
perfectly competitive intermediate good producers is to avoid interactions between price setting
and wage bargaining at the ¯rm level.
6conditions. Accordingly, we have
Ut = 1 ¡ Nt¡1 + ±Nt¡1 = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Nt¡1 (3)
Among those unemployed at the beginning of period t, a measure Ht ´
R 1
0 Ht(j) dj
are hired and start working in the same period. Aggregate hiring evolves accord-
ing to
Ht = Nt ¡ (1 ¡ ±) Nt¡1 (4)
where Nt ´
R 1
0 Nt(j) dj denotes aggregate employment.
We introduce an index of labor market tightness, xt, which we de¯ne as the ratio





This tightness index xt will play a central role in what follows. It is assumed
to lie within the interval [0;1]. Only workers in the unemployment pool at the
beginning of the period can be hired (Ht · Ut).
Note that, from the viewpoint of the unemployed, the index xt has an alternative
interpretation: It is the probability of being hired in period t, or, in other words,
the job-¯nding rate. Below we use the terms labor market tightness and job-
¯nding rate interchangeably.
Hiring costs.
Hiring labor is costly. Hiring costs for an individual ¯rm are given by Gt Ht(j),
expressed in terms of the CES bundle of goods. Gt represents the cost per hire,
which is independent of Ht(j) and taken as given by each individual ¯rm.
While Gt is taken as given by each ¯rm, it is an increasing function of labor
market tightness. Formally, we assume
Gt = At Bx
®
t
7where ® ¸ 0 and B is a positive constant.3 It is convenient, for later use, to de¯ne
gt ´ Bx®
t , so Gt = At gt.
Note that, under our formalization, vacancies are assumed to be ¯lled immediately
by paying the hiring cost, which is a function of labor market tightness. By
contrast, in the DMP model, the hiring cost is uncertain, with its expected value
corresponding to the (per period) cost of posting a vacancy times the expected
time to ¯ll it. This expected time is an increasing function of the ratio of vacancies
to unemployment, which can be expressed in turn as a function of labor market
tightness. Thus, while the formalism used to capture the presence of hiring costs
is di®erent, both approaches share the basic characteristic that the cost of hiring
is increasing in labor market tightness.
Finally, it is useful, for future reference, to de¯ne an alternative measure of un-
employment, denoted by ut, and given by the fraction of the population who are
left without a job after hiring takes place in period t. Formally, and given our
assumption of full participation, we have
ut = 1 ¡ Nt
2.2 The Constrained-E±cient Allocation
We derive the constrained-e±cient allocation by solving the problem of a benev-
olent social planner who faces the technological constraints and labor market
frictions that are present in the decentralized economy. The social planner, how-
ever, internalizes the e®ect of variations in labor market tightness on hiring costs
and, hence, on the resource constraint.
Given symmetry in preferences and technology, e±ciency requires that identical
quantities of each good be produced and consumed, i.e. Ct(i) = Ct for all i 2 [0;1].
Furthermore, since labor market participation has no individual cost but some
social bene¯t (it lowers hiring costs, for any given level of employment and hiring),
3. The motivation for the presence of At in the expression for Gt is to avoid e®ects of produc-
tivity shocks on the cost of hiring relative to the cost of producing, an e®ect we believe is best
left out of the model.
8the social planner will always choose an allocation with full participation (though
not necessarily full employment, since higher employment generates disutility and
raises hiring costs).
Hence the social planner maximizes (1) subject to (2) and the aggregate resource
constraint
Ct = At (Nt ¡ Bx
®
t Ht) (6)
where Ht and xt are de¯ned in (4) and (5).
The optimality condition for the planner's problem can be written as
CtN
Á
t · At ¡ (1 + ®)AtBx
®
t






t+1 (1 + ®(1 ¡ xt+1))
¾
(7)
which holds with equality if Nt < 1. Henceforth, we restrict our analysis (both
of the social planner's problem and the equilibrium) to allocations characterized
by Nt 2 (0;1) for all t (and, hence, positive unemployment).
Note that the left-hand side of (7) represents the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and consumption, whereas the right-hand side captures the corre-
sponding marginal rate of transformation. The latter has two components: The
¯rst component corresponds to the additional output, net of hiring costs, gener-
ated by a marginal employed worker. The second captures the savings in hiring
costs resulting from the reduced hiring needs in period t + 1.4
The solution to this equation is easy to characterize:
² Consider ¯rst the case where labor market frictions are absent (i.e. B =
0). In that case we have Ct = AtNt, and the equilibrium condition (7)
4. Note that hiring costs (normalized by productivity) at time t are given by Bx®
t Ht . The
term Bx®
t in (7) captures the increase in hiring costs resulting from an additional hire, keeping
cost per hire unchanged. The term ®Bx®
t re°ects the e®ect on hiring costs of the change in
the tightness index xt induced by an additional hire (given Ht). The savings in hiring costs at
t+1 also have two components, both of which are proportional to 1¡±, the decline in required
hiring. The ¯rst component, Bx®
t+1, captures saving resulting from a lower Ht+1, given cost per
hire. The (negative) term ®Bx®
t (1¡xt+1) adjusts the ¯rst component to take into account the
lower cost per hire brought about by a smaller xt+1 (the e®ect of lower required hires, Ht+1,




t = 1 (8)
if Â ¸ 1, or Nt = 1 if Â < 1. In either case, the constrained-e±cient
allocation implies a level of employment invariant to productivity shocks.
This invariance is the result of o®setting income and substitution e®ects
on labor supply. Absent capital accumulation, consumption increases in
proportion to productivity; given a speci¯cation of preferences consistent
with balanced growth, this increase in consumption leads to an income
e®ect that exactly o®sets the substitution e®ect.
When labor market frictions are present (i.e. B > 0), the solution to
(7) involves a constant job ¯nding rate x¤, which, assuming an interior
solution, is implicitly determined by
(1¡±Bx
®) ÂN(x)
1+Á = 1¡(1¡¯(1¡±))(1+®) Bx
®¡¯(1¡±)® Bx
1+® (9)
where N(x) ´ x
±+(1¡±)x is the level of employment given x. Thus, the




± + (1 ¡ ±)x¤
The implied levels of consumption and output are proportional to produc-
tivity, and given by C¤
t = AtN¤(1 ¡ ±Bx¤®) and Y ¤
t = At N¤.
Thus, the equilibrium inherits the main property of the equilibrium without fric-
tions, namely the invariance of employment to productivity shocks. It does so be-
cause, at an unchanged employment level, both the marginal rate of substitution
and the (social) marginal rate of transformation increase in the same proportion
as productivity, given our assumptions on preferences and technology.
5. The condition for an interior solution to (9) is that the marginal rate of substitution be
greater than the (social) marginal rate of transformation, both evaluated at full employment
(i.e. evaluated at N = 1;x = 1;H = ±):
Â(1 ¡ ±B) > 1 ¡ (1 + ® ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±))B
10This invariance result is obviously a special one (e.g. it would no longer hold if we
introduced capital accumulation). It is, however, very convenient for our purposes,
since it establishes a simple benchmark. And it contains a more general lesson.
Even in a model with labor market frictions, the behavior of the marginal rate
of substitution remains central to the outcome.
The next step is to characterize the equilibrium in the decentralized economy. We
consider ¯rst the case of °exible prices, leaving the introduction of price rigidities
to the following section.
3 Equilibrium Under Flexible Prices
3.1 Price setting
Let Pt be the price level (the price index associated with Ct), P I
t be the price of
the intermediate good, and Wt be the real wage (the wage in terms of the bundle
of ¯nal consumption goods).
Intermediate goods ¯rms take the price of their good as given. Pro¯t maximiza-













Note that the left-hand side represents the real marginal revenue product of labor,
while the right-hand side denotes the real marginal cost (including the component
associated with hiring costs).
Pro¯t maximization by ¯nal goods ¯rms requires Pt = M P I
t for all t, where
M ´ ²






















Solving (11) forward, it follows that the rate at which labor is hired, and hence
labor market tightness, depends on the expected discounted stream of marginal
11pro¯ts generated by an additional hire. Marginal pro¯t depends in turn on the
ratio of the wage to productivity.
Next we turn to wage determination. The presence of labor market frictions
generates a surplus associated with established employment relationships. The
wage determines how that surplus is split between workers and ¯rms. We consider
two alternative wage-determination regimes.
3.2 Nash-Bargained Wages
The ¯rst regime, following much of the literature, is Nash bargaining. Note that
the value of an employed member to a household, denoted by VN
t , is given by
V
N
t = Wt ¡ ÂCtN
'




[(1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ xt+1)) V
N





t is the value of an unemployed member, given in turn by
V
U














t , can be written as
S
H
t = Wt ¡ ÂCtN
'









On the other hand, the ¯rm's surplus from an established employment relation-
ship, denoted by SF






since any current worker can be immediately replaced with someone who is un-
employed by paying the hiring cost, Gt.
The Nash bargain must satisfy
S
H
t = # S
F
t
12where # represents the relative bargaining power of workers. Combining this
















The bargained wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution plus|to the
extent that workers have some bargaining power (# > 0) and labor market fric-
tions are present (B > 0)|an additional term re°ecting labor market conditions.
This term is increasing in current labor market tightness xt (since this raises
the ¯rm's surplus associated with an existing relationship) and decreasing in ex-
pected future hiring costs, At+1Bx®
t+1, and the probability of not ¯nding a job if
unemployed next period, (1 ¡ xt+1), since those raise the continuation value to
an employed worker, thus reducing the required wage today.
Equation (11) implicitly gives the wage consistent with price setting. Equation


















It can easily be checked that the equilibrium implies again a constant job ¯nding









where, as before, N(x) ´ x




± + (1 ¡ ±)x
6. The condition for an interior solution is now given by
Â(1 ¡ ±B) >
1
M
¡ (1 + # ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±))B
13Consumption, output, and the real wage all vary in proportion to productivity.









The condition for full participation is given by Wt > ÂCt for all t, since ÂCt corre-
sponds to the marginal rate of substitution evaluated at \full employment" (i.e.
at Nt = 1). Under our assumption that wages are Nash-bargained, so employment
is constant, this condition reduces to ( 1
M ¡(1¡¯(1¡±))g) > ÂN(x)(1¡±g). We
shall assume that this condition holds throughout (and verify that it is the case
for the calibrations below).
Note the two main characteristics of the equilibrium with Nash-bargained wages:
The equilibrium unemployment rate generally di®ers from the constrained-e±cient
rate. Comparing (9) and (16) shows that the two unemployment rates coincide if
M = 1 and # = ®
i.e. in the absence of e®ective market power by ¯nal goods ¯rms, and when the
relative bargaining power of workers matches the elasticity of hiring costs relative
to the labor market tightness index|a Hosios-like condition, familiar from DMP
models.
Whether or not the equilibrium unemployment rate is equal to the constrained-
e±cient rate, it shares however its property that it is invariant to productivity
shocks. The source of the invariance again comes from the o®setting income and
substitution e®ects, leading to a one-for-one response of the wage to productivity,
and resulting in constant employment and unemployment rates.
This invariance result is di®erent from the Shimer puzzle, the argument by Shimer
(2005) that the DMP model implies small movements in unemployment in re-
sponse to movements in productivity. To see how the two results are related,
return to the wage schedule under Nash bargaining, equation (14). Shimer's re-
sult was derived under the assumption that the ¯rst term|the marginal rate of
14substitution|was constant. He then argued that, under reasonable values of the
parameters characterizing labor market frictions, the second term|the term due
to frictions|was likely to imply large movements in wages in response to produc-
tivity, and, by implication, small movements in pro¯t, job creation, employment,
and unemployment. In contrast, our neutrality result follows entirely from move-
ments in the marginal rate of substitution. Under our assumptions, the marginal
rate of substitution moves one-for-one with productivity, so employment does not
change, and labor market frictions have no role to play. It is clear that, under
more general assumptions (for example in models where consumption increases
less than one-for-one with productivity, because of the presence of investment),
both the marginal rate of substitution and labor market frictions will determine
the wage response. Because the marginal rate of substitution is likely to increase
with productivity (although not necessarily one-for-one as it does here), the wage
response will be stronger than in the DMP model. Put another way, the Shimer
puzzle will be even stronger than in the original Shimer set-up.
This large response of the wage to productivity movements appears counterfac-
tual. This has led several authors to introduce some form of real wage rigidity in
order to match the small movements in the wage and the large movements in un-
employment.7 Following their lead, the next subsection introduces wage rigidity,
and analyzes its implications for equilibrium unemployment.
3.3 Real Wage Rigidities
As emphasized by Hall (2005), the presence of a surplus associated with existing
relations implies that many wages may be consistent with equilibrium. More
speci¯cally, existing employment relationships will be privately e±cient so long
as they generate a positive surplus to both parties involved. Thus, and using
the notation introduced in the previous subsection, any wage path such that
SH
t ¸ 0 and SF
t ¸ 0 for all t is consistent with equilibrium. Nash-bargaining
generates only one such path.
7. See Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), and Gertler and Trigari (2006). For a view that such
rigidities may not be needed, see Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006).
15In the context of our model, a su±cient condition for SH
t ¸ 0 is given by Wt ¸
ÂCtN
Á
t for all t, which is in turn already implied by the full participation condition
Wt ¸ ÂCt. On the other hand, a su±cient condition for SF




Pt At = At
M for all t, i.e. the existence of non-negative pro¯ts (gross of hiring
costs) for intermediate goods ¯rms. It follows that any wage path satisfying
ÂCt · Wt ·
At
M
for all t is consistent with equilibrium. Note that, under our assumptions, the pre-
vious condition is satis¯ed when the wage is determined through Nash bargaining.
In what follows, we shall assume the economy °uctuates in a neighborhood of the
steady state under Nash bargaining. In that case, and to the extent that shocks
are not too large, the previous condition will also be satis¯ed.
How to formalize real wage rigidity is still very much an open research question.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume a wage schedule of the form
Wt = £ A
1¡°
t (18)
where ° 2 [0;1] is an index of real wage rigidities, and £ is a positive constant.
Clearly, the above formulation is meaningful only if technology is stationary, an
assumption we shall maintain here. Denoting the unconditional mean of At by A,
we assume that £ ´ ( 1
M¡(1¡¯(1¡±))Bx®) A°. This implies that the mean wage
coincides with the mean wage under Nash-bargaining. Note then that for ° = 0,
the wage corresponds exactly to the equilibrium wage under Nash bargaining (as
given by (17)). At the other extreme, when ° = 1, equation (18) corresponds to
the canonical example of a rigid wage analyzed by Hall (2005).
Combining the wage equation (18) with the equation for the wage implied by






































where ¤t;t+k ´ (Ct=Ct+k) (At+k=At).
The previous equation makes clear the central role of labor market tightness xt in
this economy with labor market frictions and rigid real wages. As long as wages
are not fully °exible (° > 0), labor market tightness, and, by implication, move-
ments in employment and in unemployment, depend on current and anticipated
productivity. Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), and the research which has followed
their two articles, studied the implications of equations similar to (20) for °uc-
tuations in wages, employment, and unemployment in response to productivity
shocks. By contrast, our goal here is to study the implications in an economy
with nominal rigidities, and the role for monetary policy. To do so, we need to
introduce price stickiness. This is what we do in the next section.
4 Introducing Nominal Rigidities
Following much of the recent literature on monetary business cycle models, we in-
troduce sticky prices in our model with labor market frictions using the formalism
due to Calvo (1983). Each period, only a fraction 1¡µ of the ¯nal goods produc-
ers, selected randomly, reset prices. The remaining ¯nal goods producers, with










t denotes the price newly set by a ¯nal goods producer at time t.












t denotes the price newly set by at time t, Yt+kjt is the level of output in
period t+k for a ¯rm resetting its price in period t, M ´ ²
²¡1 is the gross desired
markup, and MCt is the real marginal cost for ¯nal goods producers.
Real marginal cost is turn given by P I
t =Pt. Under the maintained assumption of
°exible prices in the market for intermediate goods, so, using equation (10) for
the price of intermediate goods, and equation (18) for wage setting, real marginal
cost is given by















Equations (22) and (23) embody the essence of our framework:
² The optimal price setting equation (22) takes the same form as in the
standard Calvo model, given the path of marginal costs: It leads ¯rms to
choose a price that is a weighted average of current and expected marginal
costs, with the weights being a function of µ, the price stickiness parameter.
² The marginal cost in equation (23) depends on labor market frictions (as
captured by hiring cost parameters B and ®) and on real wage rigidities
(measured by °).
To make progress requires log-linearizing the system, the task to which we now
turn.
4.1 Log-linearized Equilibrium Dynamics
Let lower case variables with hats denote log deviations of the corresponding
upper case variables from their steady state values.
² From equations (21) and (22), we get, after log-linearization around a zero
in°ation steady state, an expression for in°ation8
¼t = ¯ Etf¼t+1g + ¸ c mct (24)
8. See, e.g., Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) for a derivation.
18where ¸ ´ (1 ¡ ¯µ)(1 ¡ µ)=µ.
² From equation (23), we get an expression for marginal cost,
c mct = ®gM b xt¡¯(1¡±)gM Etf(b ct¡b at)¡(b ct+1¡b at+1)+® b xt+1g¡©° b at
(25)
where © ´ MW=A = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±))gM < 1.
² From equation (5), we get an expression for labor market tightness as a
function of current and lagged employment
± b xt = b nt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x) b nt¡1 (26)
² From equation (6), we get an expression for consumption









± b xt (27)
² From the ¯rst order conditions of the consumer (which we have ignored
until now), we get:
b ct = Etfb ct+1g ¡ (it ¡ Etf¼t+1g ¡ ½) (28)
where ½ ´ ¡log¯.
The equilibrium is characterized by equations (24) to (28), together with a process
for productivity and a description of monetary policy.
4.2 Unemployment and In°ation
Before we turn to the analysis of alternative policies using the previous equilib-
rium conditions, we focus on the \Phillips curve" relation between unemployment
and in°ation implied by our model.
In order to facilitate intuition (and only in this subsection), we do so under two
approximations. The ¯rst is that hiring costs are small relative to output (g is
small), so we can approximate consumption by b ct = b at + b nt, and by implication,
19we can approximate (b ct ¡ b at) ¡ (b ct+1 ¡ b at+1) in equation (25) by b nt ¡ b nt+1. The
second is that the separation rate, ±, is small, so, from equation (26), °uctuations
in b xt are large relative to those in b nt. This in turn implies that we can ignore the
terms b nt ¡ b nt+1 in equation (25). Using these two approximations, and the fact
that, if ± is small, ¯(1 ¡ ±) ¼ ¯, equation (25) can be approximated by:
c mct = ®gM (b xt ¡ ¯ Etfb xt+1g) ¡ ©° b at (29)
Combining equation (29) and equation (24) then gives us a relation between
in°ation, labor market tightness, and productivity:




k Etfb at+kg (30)
Note that, despite the fact that expected in°ation does not appear in (30), in°a-
tion is a forward looking variable, through its dependence on current and future
at's, and current xt, which itself depends on current and expected real marginal
costs.9
Using equation (26), letting b ut ´ ut ¡ u denote the deviation (not the log devi-
ation) of the unemployment rate (after hiring) from its steady state value, and
using the approximation b ut = ¡(1 ¡ u) b nt, gives us in turn a relation between
labor market tightness and the unemployment rate:
(1 ¡ u)± b xt = ¡b ut + (1 ¡ x)(1 ¡ ±) b ut¡1 (31)
The relation of labor market tightness to current and lagged unemployment will
play an important role in what follows. To see what it implies, consider two labor
markets. One, with high values of both ± and x, so with high °ows and low unem-
ployment duration, which we shall call \°uid." We think of that characterization
as capturing the U.S. labor market. The other, with low values of ± and x, so
with low °ows and high unemployment duration, which we shall call \sclerotic"
9. This can be seen by solving (29) forward, to get ®gM b xt =
P1
k=0 ¯k Etfc mct+k+©° at+kg.
20and think of as capturing continental European labor markets. In the °uid labor
market, (1¡x)(1¡±) is small, so relative labor market tightness moves with the
(negative) of the unemployment rate. In the sclerotic labor market, (1¡x)(1¡±)
is large, so relative labor market tightness moves more with the (negative) of the
change in the unemployment rate. The intuition is as follows: In a °uid labor mar-
ket, average °ows are high and, given the constant separation rate, depend on the
level of employment rate (equivalently, on the level of unemployment). Changes
in employment (equivalently, changes in unemployment) lead to small relative
changes in the °ows, thus to small relative changes in labor market tightness. In
a sclerotic labor market, average °ows are low. Changes in employment (equiva-
lently, in unemployment) lead to large relative changes in the °ows. Thus, relative
labor market tightness depends more on the change in employment (equivalently,
on the change in unemployment).
Putting equations (30) and (31) together gives the relation between in°ation and
unemployment implied by our model. Assume, for simplicity, that productivity
follows a stationary AR(1) process with autoregressive parameter ½a 2 [0;1). We
can then rewrite (30) as
¼t = ®gM¸ b xt ¡ ª° b at (32)
where ª ´ ¸©=(1¡¯½a) > 0. Thus, in°ation depends positively on labor market
tightness, and negatively (if ° > 0) on productivity. The higher the degree of
real wage rigidity, or the more persistent the productivity process, the larger the
e®ect of productivity on in°ation.
Replacing market tightness by its expression from equation (31) gives:
¼t = ¡· b ut + ·(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x) b ut¡1 ¡ ª° b at (33)
where · ´ ®gM¸=±(1 ¡ u). Or equivalently
¼t = ¡·(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x)) b ut ¡ ·(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x) ¢b ut ¡ ª° b at
which highlights the negative dependence of in°ation on both the level and the
21change in the unemployment rate, with the weights attached to each being a
function of the degree of °uidity of the labor market: The more sclerotic the labor
market, the weaker the e®ect of the level of unemployment, and the stronger the
e®ect of the change in unemployment.
Given that the constrained-e±cient unemployment is constant, it would be best
to stabilize both unemployment and in°ation. Note however that, to the extent
that the wage does not adjust fully to productivity changes (° > 0), it is not
possible for the monetary authority to fully stabilize both unemployment and in-
°ation simultaneously. There is, to use the terminology introduced by Blanchard
and Gal¶ ³ (2007), no divine coincidence. The reason is the same as in our earlier
paper, the fact that productivity shocks a®ect the wedge between the natural
rate|the unemployment rate that would prevail absent nominal rigidities|and
the constrained-e±cient unemployment rate. Stabilizing in°ation, which is equiv-
alent to stabilizing unemployment at its natural rate, does not deliver constant
unemployment. Symmetrically, stabilizing unemployment does not deliver con-
stant in°ation.
The next two sections examine the implications of alternative monetary policy
regimes, both qualitative and quantitative. In doing so, we go back to the \exact"
log-linearized model, characterized earlier.
5 Unemployment, In°ation, and Monetary Policy
To characterize the e®ects of monetary policy, we must ¯rst derive the exact
version of the Phillips curve. Note ¯rst that combining (26) and (27) we obtain
b ct = b at + »0 b nt + »1 b nt¡1
where »0 ´
1¡g(1+®)
(1¡±g) and »1 ´
g(1¡±)(1+®(1¡x))
(1¡±g) . Replacing this expression, together
with (31), into (25) gives an expression for marginal cost:
c mct = h0 b nt + hL b nt¡1 + hF Etfb nt+1g ¡ ©° b at
22where
h0 ´ (®gM=±)(1 + ¯(1 ¡ ±)
2(1 ¡ x)) + ¯(1 ¡ ±)gM(»1 ¡ »0)
hL ´ ¡(®gM=±) (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)gM»1
hF ´ ¡¯(1 ¡ ±)gM ((®=±) ¡ »0)
Replacing real marginal cost in equation (24) by the expression above, and using
the fact that b ut = ¡(1¡u) b nt, gives the following Phillips curve relation between
in°ation to unemployment:
¼t = ¯Etf¼t+1g ¡ ·0 b ut + ·L b ut¡1 + ·F Etfb ut+1g ¡ ¸©° b at (34)
where ·0 ´ ¸h0=(1 ¡ u), ·L ´ ¡¸hL=(1 ¡ u), and ·F ´ ¸hF=(1 ¡ u).
5.1 Two Extreme Policies
We start by discussing two simple, but extreme, policies and their outcomes for
in°ation and unemployment.
Unemployment stabilization. Recall that in the constrained e±cient alloca-
tion unemployment is constant. A policy that seeks to stabilize the gap between
unemployment and its e±cient level requires therefore that b ut = 0 for all t (and,
hence, b nt = b xt = 0 for all t as well). Thus, it follows from (34) that
¼t = ¡ª° b at (35)
where, as above, ª ´ ¸©=(1 ¡ ¯½a) > 0. The stabilization of unemployment
(and thus of hiring costs) makes the real marginal cost vary negatively with
productivity, according to ^ mct = ¡ª°at, generating °uctuations in in°ation.
The amplitude of those °uctuations is increasing in the degree of wage rigidities
° (ª does not depend on °), and in the persistence of the productivity process,
½a, but is decreasing in the degree of nominal rigidities (which is inversely related
to ¸).
Strict in°ation targeting. As (24) makes clear, setting ¼t = 0 for all t requires
23that real marginal cost be fully stabilized, i.e. c mct = 0 for all t. Given that
variations in productivity are not fully o®set by a proportional adjustment in the
wage, stabilizing the real marginal cost requires that unemployment (and, with
it, hiring costs) varies negatively with productivity. Imposing ¼t = 0 for all t in
(34) yields the following di®erence equation for unemployment:
b ut = dL b ut¡1 + dF Etfb ut+1g ¡ da b at
where dL ´ ·L=·0, dF ´ ·F=·0, and da ´ (¸©°=·0). The stationary solution
takes the form





2dF and c ´
¸©=·0
1¡dF(b+½a).
Equation (36) points to a number of properties of strict in°ation targeting poli-
cies. First, the volatility of unemployment under that policy regime is propor-
tional to °, the degree of wage rigidities, since the coe±cients b and c are indepen-
dent of that parameter. Second, the unemployment rate displays some intrinsic
persistence, i.e. some serial correlation beyond that inherited from productiv-
ity. The degree of intrinsic persistence is given by coe±cient b, which was equal
to (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ x) under the simplifying approximations made in the previous
sections, and very close to it under plausible parameter calibrations, as shown
below. Thus, the degree of intrinsic unemployment persistence depends critically
on the separation rate ± and the steady state job ¯nding rate x. In a "sclerotic"
labor market, that is, a market with low x and low ±, and under strict in°ation
targeting, unemployment will display strong persistence, well beyond that inher-
ited from productivity. Persistence will be much lower in a °uid labor market, a
market with high x and high ±.10
Finally, note that the previous equation also characterizes the evolution of unem-
ployment under °exible prices, since the allocation consistent with price stability
replicates the one associated with the °exible price equilibrium.
10. The hypothesis that more sclerotic markets might lead to more persistence to unemploy-
ment was explored empirically by Barro (1988).
245.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
We are now ready to characterize optimal policy. To simplify the analysis and
avoid well understood but peripheral issues, we assume that unemployment °uc-
tuates around a steady state value which corresponds to that of the constrained
e±cient allocation. As shown in Appendix A, a second order approximation to








t + ®u b u
2
t) (37)
where ®u ´ ¸(1 + Á)Â(1 ¡ u)Á¡1=² > 0:
Hence the monetary authority will seek to minimize (37) subject to the sequence
of equilibrium constraints given by (34), for t = 0;1;2;::: Clearly, given the form
of the welfare loss function, the optimal policy will be somewhere between the
two extreme policies discussed above. The ¯rst order conditions take the form:
2¼t + ³t ¡ ³t¡1 = 0 (38)
2®u b ut + ·0 ³t ¡ ¯·L Etf³t+1g ¡ ¯
¡1·F ³t¡1 = 0 (39)
for t = 0;1;2;:::where ³t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with period t
constraint, and where ³¡1 = 0:
The dynamical system describing the optimal policy is thus composed of (38)
and (39), together with in°ation equation (34), and a process for productivity at.
The solution to that dynamical system can be obtained using standard methods
for linear stochastic di®erence equations (see, e.g., Blanchard and Kahn (1980)).
The next section gives a sense of the quantitative properties of the model, based
on a rough calibration, and with a focus on the implications of di®erent labor
markets|°uid versus sclerotic|for monetary policy.
256 Calibration and Quantitative Analysis
We take each period to correspond to a quarter. For the parameters describing
preferences we assume values commonly found in the literature: ¯ = 0:99, Á = 1,
and ² = 6 (implying a gross steady state markup M = 1:2).
We set ¸ = 1=12, which is consistent with an average duration of prices between
three and four quarters, in accordance with much of the micro and macro evidence
on price setting. Having no hard evidence on the degree of real wage rigidities,
we set ° equal to 0:5, the midpoint of the admissible range.11
In order to calibrate ® we exploit a simple mapping between our model and the
standard DMP model. In the latter, the expected cost per hire is proportional
to the expected duration of a vacancy, which in the steady state is given by
V=H where V denotes the number of vacancies. Assuming a matching function




1¡´. Hence, the para-
meter ® in our hiring cost function corresponds to ´=(1 ¡ ´) in the DMP model.
Since estimates of ´ are typically close to 1=2, we assume ® = 1 in our baseline
calibration.
We then choose the remaining coe±cients to capture two di®erent types of labor
markets, through two di®erent calibrations. Our baseline calibration attempts to
capture the °uid U.S. labor market. We choose parameters so the unemployment
rate is equal to 5%, and the job ¯nding rate x is equal to 0:7 (this quarterly
job ¯nding rate corresponds, approximately, to a monthly rate of 0:3, consistent
with U.S. evidence).12 The alternative calibration attempts to capture the more
sclerotic continental European labor market. We choose parameters so the unem-
ployment rate is 10%, and x = 0:25 (consistent with a monthly job ¯nding rate
of 0:1).
These choices of x and u determine in turn the separation rate, through the
11. Under an overly strict interpretation of our model, ° can be obtained through a regression
of real wage growth on productivity growth|which is exogenous in our model. Such a regression
yields a coe±cient between 0.3 and 0.4 using postwar U.S. data, so a value for ° between 0.6 and
0.7. Stepping outside our model, obvious caveats apply, from the measurement of productivity
growth, to the direction of causality.
12. We compute the equivalent quarterly rate as xm + (1¡xm)xm + (1¡xm)2xm, where xm
is the monthly job ¯nding rate.
26relation ± = ux=((1 ¡ u)(1 ¡ x)). This yields a value for ± of 0:12 for the United
States, and 0:04 for continental Europe.
The next step is to choose a value for B, which determines the level of hiring
costs. Notice that, in the steady state, hiring costs represent a fraction ±g = ±Bx®
of GDP. Lacking any direct evidence, we choose B so that under our baseline
calibration for the United States, that fraction equals one percent of GDP, which
seems a plausible upper bound. This implies B = 0:01=(0:12)(0:7) ' 0:12: We
use this value of B for both calibrations.
Finally, we use equation (9), which gives the constrained-e±cient value of x to tie
down the value of Â. This implies Â ' 1:03 for the United States, and Â ' 1:22
for Europe.13 The implied value of ®u is 0:0237 for the U.S. calibration and 0:0283
for Europe.14
6.1 The Dynamic E®ects of Productivity Shocks
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the e®ects of a productivity shock under alternative
monetary policies, for each of the two calibrations of the labor market. In Figure
1 we assume a purely transitory shock (½a = 0), which allows us to isolate the
model's intrinsic persistence, whereas in Figure 2 we assume ½a = 0:9, a more
realistic degree of persistence. In each ¯gure we display the responses of in°ation
and unemployment for both the U.S. and European labor market calibrations.
In all cases we report responses to a one-percent decline in productivity. All the
responses are shown in percentage points, and in annual terms in the case of
in°ation.
We begin by discussing the case of a transitory shock.
13. Note that our model can only account for a higher e±cient steady state unemployment
rate in Europe by assuming a larger disutility of labor. Alternatively, we could have assumed
an e±cient steady state only for the United States, and impose the implied Â to the European
calibration as well. In that case, however, the steady state unemployment for Europe would not
be e±cient and an additional linear term would appear in the loss function, complicating the
analysis in an uninteresting (and well understood) way.
14. Such a (seemingly low) value is of the same order of magnitude as the weight on the output
gap in calibrated loss functions found in the literature.
27The top left panel of Figure 1 shows the response of in°ation to the adverse
transitory productivity shock, under a policy that fully stabilizes unemployment.
The response is nearly identical for both calibrations, implying a one-period rise
in in°ation of less than 20 basis points, with a subsequent return to its initial level
once the shock dies out. The top right panel shows the response of unemployment
to an identical adverse productivity shock, under a policy that fully stabilizes
in°ation. Unemployment rises by about 65 basis points on impact in the U.S.
calibration, 50 basis points in the European one. Unemployment remains above
its initial value well after the shock has vanished, with the persistence being
signi¯cantly greater under the European calibration.
The bottom left and right panels of Figure 1 show, respectively, the response
of in°ation and unemployment under the optimal monetary policy. The optimal
policy strikes a balance between the two extreme policies, and achieves a more
muted response of both in°ation and unemployment (note that, to facilitate com-
parison, the scale of the graph is the same across policy regimes, for any given
variable). The di®erences in the responses across the two calibrations are small.
Interestingly, the persistence in both variables is tiny (though not zero) under
both calibrations. Perhaps the most salient feature of the exercise is the substan-
tial reduction in unemployment volatility under the optimal policy relative to a
constant in°ation policy, achieved at a relatively small cost in terms of in°ation
volatility.
Figure 2 displays corresponding results, but under the assumption that ½a = 0:9,
a more realistic degree of persistence.
The response of in°ation under the constant unemployment policy, shown in the
top left panel of Figure 2, is now much larger, with an increase of about 150 basis
points on impact under both calibrations. This ampli¯cation e®ect re°ects the
forward looking nature of in°ation and the persistent anticipated e®ects on real
marginal costs generated by the interaction of the shock and real wage rigidities.
Note also that in°ation inherits the persistence of the shock, as implied by (35).
The response of unemployment under a strict in°ation targeting policy, shown
on the top right panel, is also much larger with a persistent shock. The un-
28employment rate increases on impact by about 3 percentage points under both
calibrations, a sizeable rise. In both cases, unemployment is highly persistent, and
displays a prominent hump-shaped pattern, reaching a maximum rise of about 8
percentage points (!) in the case of Europe.15 The degree of persistence is remark-
ably larger under the European calibration, for the reasons discussed earlier.
The bottom panels show the behavior of in°ation and unemployment under the
optimal monetary policy. The increase in unemployment is 50 basis points under
the U.S. calibration, about half that size under the European one. Note that the
size of such responses is several times smaller than under the strict in°ation tar-
geting policy. The price for having a smoother unemployment path is persistently
higher in°ation, with the latter variable increasing on impact by about 1 and 1:4
percentage points in the U.S. and Europe. We note that the optimal policy is
\tougher on in°ation" (i.e. more hawkish) in the U.S. relative to Europe. This
is due to the larger cost, in the form of a persistent rise in unemployment, that
results under the European calibration from policies that seek to stabilize in°a-
tion in response to an adverse productivity shocks, as illustrated by the extreme
policy analyzed above.
Table 1 summarizes the main properties of the policies analyzed above under the
two calibrations. More speci¯cally, for each policy and calibration, the ¯rst two
columns show the implied standard deviation of in°ation and unemployment,
with the standard deviation of productivity being normalized to unity (and given
½a = 0:9). In addition, we report the welfare loss implied by each policy relative to
that implied by the optimal policy. One ¯nding seems worth noting: The welfare
losses associated with a strict in°ation targeting policy appear to be very large
relative to the optimal policy, especially so under the European calibration, which
yields losses that are 25 times larger than under the optimal policy. This is again
a consequence of the substantial volatility of unemployment required to keep
in°ation unchanged in the face of productivity shocks.
In addition to the two extreme policies and the optimal policy, Table 1 displays
15. While the size of this response may be viewed as unrealistically large, it is important to
keep in mind that the policy assumed is also unrealistically extreme.
29the statistics corresponding to an "optimized simple rule." The latter is an interest
rate rule of the form
it = ½ + Á¼ ¼t + Áu b ut
where coe±cients Á¼ and Áu are chosen, for each calibration, in order to minimize
the welfare losses. The optimization is done numerically, searching over a grid
spanning the intervals Á¼ 2 (1;5] and Áu 2 [¡5;0].16 The optimal coe±cients are
Á¼ = 5 and Áu = ¡0:8 for the U.S. calibration, and Á¼ = 2 and Áu = ¡0:6 for
the European calibration. The optimized simple rule puts a smaller weight on
in°ation stabilization under the European calibration, in a way consistent with
our ¯ndings based on the optimal rule. In any event, as the results shown in
the table make clear, following such a simple rule reduces considerably the losses
relative to the extreme policies under both calibrations and, at least under the
European one, comes close to replicating the welfare outcome obtained under the
optimal policy.
7 Relation to the Literature
Our model combines four main elements: (1) standard preferences (concave utility
of consumption and leisure), (2) labor market frictions, (3) real wage rigidities,
(4) price staggering. As a result, it is related to a large and rapidly growing
literature.
Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) were the ¯rst to integrate (1) and (2), by
introducing labor market frictions in an otherwise standard RBC model. In par-
ticular, Merz derived the conditions under which Nash bargaining would or would
not deliver the constrained-e±cient allocation. Both models are richer than ours
in allowing for capital accumulation, and in the case of Andolfatto, for having
both an extensive margin (through hiring) and an intensive margin (through
adjustment of hours) for labor. In both cases, the focus was on the dynamic ef-
16. In the case of the U.S. calibration, allowing for a larger range of values yields very large (in
absolute values) coe±cients for in°ation and unemployment, with negligible gains in terms of
welfare.
30fects of productivity shocks, and in both cases, the model was solved through
simulations.
Ch¶ eron and Langot (2000), Walsh (2003) and Trigari (2006), have integrated (1),
(2) and (4), by allowing for Calvo nominal price setting by ¯rms. Their models are
again much richer than ours. Walsh allows for endogenous separations. Ch¶ eron
and Langot, as well as Trigari, allow for both an extensive and an intensive
margin for labor, with e±cient Nash bargaining over hours and the wage. In
addition Trigari considers \right to manage" bargaining, with the ¯rm choosing
freely hours ex-post. Those models are too large to be analytically tractable,
and are solved through simulations. The focus of Walsh and Trigari's papers is
on the dynamic e®ects of nominal shocks, while Ch¶ eron and Langot study the
ability of the model with both productivity and monetary shocks to generate a
Beveridge curve as well as a Phillips curve. More recent papers, by Walsh (2005),
Trigari (2005), Moyen and Sahuc (2005), and Andr¶ es et al. (2006) among others,
introduce a number of extensions, from habit persistence in preferences, to capital
accumulation, to the implications of Taylor rules. The models in these papers are
relatively complex DSGE models, which need to be studied through calibration
and simulations.
Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) were the ¯rst to integrate (2) and (3). Shimer
argued that, in the standard DMP model with Nash bargaining, wages were too
°exible, and the response of unemployment to productivity shocks was too small.
Hall (2005) showed ¯rst the scope for and then the implications of real wage
rigidities in that class of models. These models di®er from ours because of their
assumption of linear preferences (in addition to their being purely real models).
We have shown earlier the implications of this di®erence. But our results, using a
standard utility speci¯cation, reinforce their conclusion that real wage rigidities
are probably needed to explain °uctuations.
Gertler and Trigari (2005) have explored the implications of integrating (1), (2)
and (3). Their model allows for standard preferences, labor market frictions, and
real wage staggering a la Calvo. Being a real model, however, it has no room
for nominal rigidities. Their model is again too complex to be solved analyti-
cally, and is studied through simulations. Their focus is on the dynamic e®ects
31of productivity shocks.
Two papers have explored a structure closely related to ours, but with staggered
nominal wage setting rather than real wage rigidity. Thomas (2007) focuses on the
role of monetary policy in that context, with implications substantially di®erent
from ours|which suggests that a more thorough exploration of the di®erent
implications of the two alternative assumptions is needed. Gertler, Sala, and
Trigari (2007) estimate a model with standard preferences, labor market frictions,
and both nominal wage and price rigidities.
The three papers closest to ours are by Krause and Lubik (2007), Christo®el and
Linzert (2005) and Faia (2006). They integrate (1) to (4), with standard prefer-
ences, labor market frictions, real wage rigidities, and nominal price staggering by
¯rms. The three models are substantially richer than ours, and are solved through
simulations. The main focus of Krause and Lubik is on the relation between in-
°ation, marginal cost, and real wages, in the presence of matching frictions and
endogenous separations. The main focus of Christo®el and Linzert is on in°ation
persistence in response to monetary policy shocks. The main focus of Faia is on
the performance of simple monetary rules. Again, we see the comparative advan-
tage of our paper as being in its simplicity, its analytical characterization of the
e®ects of productivity shocks and optimal monetary policy in relation to labor
market characteristics. We think that our analytical model is a needed step in the
development and full understanding of these richer but more complex models.
8 Conclusions
We have constructed a model with labor market frictions, real wage rigidities, and
staggered price setting. We believe that the three ingredients above are all needed
if one is to explain movements in unemployment, the e®ects of productivity shocks
on the economy, and the role of monetary policy in shaping those e®ects.
From a positive point of view, we have shown that, in such an economy, a central
variable is the degree of labor market tightness. A tighter labor market increases
marginal cost, which in turn a®ects in°ation. The relation between in°ation and
32unemployment then depends on the relation between labor market tightness and
unemployment, and this relation varies depending on labor market characteristics.
In °uid labor markets such as the United States, labor market tightness varies
more closely with unemployment; in sclerotic labor markets, such as those in
continental Europe, labor market tightness varies more closely with the change
in unemployment. These di®erences lead in turn to important di®erences in the
response of the economy to shocks. Under in°ation stabilization for example, the
same productivity shock has more persistent e®ects in a sclerotic than in a °uid
labor market.
From a normative point of view, we have shown that, in the presence of labor
market frictions and real wage rigidities, strict in°ation stabilization does not
deliver the best monetary policy. As in Blanchard and Gali (2007), the reason
is that distortions vary with shocks. As a result, strict in°ation stabilization can
lead to ine±cient, large, and persistent, movements in unemployment in response
to productivity shocks. These e®ects can be particularly large and persistent in
sclerotic labor markets. Optimal monetary policy implies some accommodation
of in°ation, and limits the size of the °uctuations in unemployment.
33Appendix A: Derivation of the Welfare Loss Function
Under our assumed utility speci¯cation we have:




































where we have made use of the fact that up to second order Nt¡N
N ' b nt + 1
2 b n2
t.
Hence, the deviation of period utility from its steady state value, denoted by Ut;
is given by
Ut ' b ct ¡ ÂN







Next we derive an equation that relates, up to a second order approximation, b ct
and b nt. Market clearing for good i requires that At(Nt(i) ¡ g(xt)Ht(i)) = Ct(i).
Integrating over i yields:



























Thus we can write
CtDt
At
= Nt ¡ g(xt) Ht
34Under the assumption that g is small enough, so that the terms involving g b nt
are of second order, we have
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1 ¡ g(1 + ®)
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b nt +
g(1 ¡ ±)(1 + ®(1 ¡ x))
1 ¡ ±g
b nt¡1
Taking logs, and approximating the resulting right hand term up to second order
using the fact that log(1 + b zt) ' b zt ¡ 1
2b z2
t, we have
b ct = b at ¡ dt + »0 b nt + »1 b nt¡1 (41)
where »0 ´
1¡g(1+®)
1¡±g and »1 ´
g(1¡±)(1+®(1¡x))
1¡±g .
Lemma: up to a second order approximation, dt ´ logDt ' ²
2 vari(pt(i)).
Proof: See appendix B.





























»0 + ¯»1 ¡ ÂN
1+Á¢
b nt + t:i:p:
where t:i:p: denotes terms independent of policy.
Assuming that the economy °uctuates around the e±cient steady state, we can
use (9) to show that the coe±cient on b nt equals zero.
The following result allows us to express the cross-sectional variance of prices as
a function of in°ation:
Lemma:
P1






Combining the previous results, together with our de¯nition of the unemployment
rate ut, we can write the welfare losses from °uctuations around the e±cient
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It follows that dt ' (²=2) vari(pt(i)) up to a second order approximation.
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Figure 1: Dynamic Responses to a Transitory Productivity Shock
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Figure 2: Dynamic Responses to a Persistent Productivity Shock














41Table 1: Properties of Alternative Policy rules
U.S. Europe









Optimal 0.88 1.08 0.77 1.0
Constant u 1.48 0 0 1.08
Constant ʌ 0 3.76 11.27 25.6
Optimized Simple Rule 1.07 1.11 0.42 1.04
42